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IV 
CRITICISM AND T H E  HISTORY OF ART 
RTISTIC and literary criticism is often looked upon by A artists as a morose and tyrannical pedagogue who 
gives capricious orders, imposes prohibitions, and grants per- 
missions, thus aiding o r  injuring their works by wilfully de- 
ciding upon their fate. And so the artists either shew them- 
selves submissive, humble, flattering, adulatory, toward it, 
while hating it in their hearts; or, when they do not obtain 
what they want, o r  their loftiness of soul forbids that they 
should descend to those arts of the courtier, they revolt 
against it, proclaiming its uselessness, with imprecations and 
mockery, comparing (the remembrance is personal) the 
critic to  an ass that enters the potter’s shop and breaks in 
pieces with quadrupedante unguld sonitu the delicate prod- 
ucts of his ar t  set out to  dry in the sun. This time, to  tell the 
truth, it is the artists’ fault, for they do not know what criti- 
cism is, expecting from it favours which it is not in a position 
to grant, and injuries which it is not in a position to inflict: 
since it is clear that since no critic can make an artist of one 
who is not an artist, so no critic can ever undo, overthrow, 
or  even slightly injure an artist who is really an artist, owing 
to the metaphysical impossibility of such an act: these things 
have never happened in the course of history, they do not 
happen in our day, and we can be sure that they will never 
happen in the future. But sometimes it is the critics them- 
selves, o r  the self-styled critics, who do actually present 
themselves as pedagogues, as oracles, as guides of art, as 
legislators, seers, and prophets ; they command artists to 
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do this o r  that, they assign themes to  them and declare that 
certain subjects are poetical, and certain others not:  they are 
discontented with the ar t  a t  present produced, and would 
prefer one similar to that prevailing at  this o r  that epoch of 
the past, o r  at another of which they declare they catch a 
glimpse in the near o r  remote future; they will reprove 
Tasso for  not being Ariosto, Leopardi for not being Me- 
tastasio, Manzoni for  not being Alfieri, D’Annunzio because 
he is not Berchet or F ra  Jacopone; and they describe the 
great artist of the future, supplying him with ethic, philos- 
ophy, history, language, metric, with architectonic and col- 
ouristic processes, and with whatever it may seem to them 
that he stands in need. And this time it is clear that the 
blame lies with the critic; and the artists are right in behav- 
ing toward such brutality in the way that we behave toward 
beasts, which we try to tame, to illude and to delude, in 
order that they may serve us; or we drive them away and 
send them to the slaughter-house when they are no longer 
good for any service. But for  the honour of criticism we 
must add that those capricious critics are not so much critics 
as artists : artists who have failed and who aspire to  a certain 
form of art, which they are unable to  attain, either because 
their aspiration was contradictory, or because their power 
was not sufficient and failed them; and thus, preserving in 
their soul the bitterness of the unrealised ideal, they can 
speak of nothing else, lamenting everywhere its absence, and 
everywhere invoking its presence. And sometimes, too, 
they are artists who are anything but failures,-indeed, most 
felicitous artists,-but, owing to  the very energy of their 
artistic individuality, incapable of emerging from themselves 
in order to  understand forms of ar t  different from their 
own, and disposed to reject them with violence; they are 
aided in this negation by the odium figulinum, the jealousy 
294 The Breviary of &sthetic 
of the artist for the artist, which is without doubt a defect, 
but one with which too many excellent artists appear to be 
stained for us to refuse to it some indulgence similar to that 
accorded to the defects of women, so difficult, as we know, 
to separate from their good qualities. Other artists should 
calmly reply to these artist-critics : “Continue doing in your 
art  what you do so well, and let us do what we can do”; and 
to the artists who have failed and improvised themselves 
critics: “DO not claim that we should do what you have 
failed in doing, o r  what is work of the future, of which 
neither you nor we know anything.” As a fact, this is not 
the usual reply, because passion forms half of i t ;  but this is 
indeed the logical reply, which logically terminates the ques- 
tion, though we must foresee that the altercation will not 
terminate, but will indeed last as long as there are intolerant 
artists and failures-that is to say, for  ever. 
And there is another conception of criticism, which is ex- 
pressed in the magistrate and in the judge, as the foregoing 
is expressed in the pedagogue o r  in the tyrant; it attributes 
to criticism the duty, not of promoting and guiding the life 
of art,-which is promoted and guided, if you like to call it 
so, only by history; that is, by the complex movement of the 
spirit in its historical course,-but simply to separate, in the 
art  which has already been produced, the beautiful from the 
ugly, and to approve the beautiful and reprove the ugly 
with the solemnity of a properly austere and conscientious 
sentence. But I fear that the blame of uselessness will not 
be removed from criticism, even with this other definition, 
although perhaps the motive of this blame may to some 
extent be changed. Is there really need of criticism in order 
to distinguish the beautiful from the ugly? T h e  production 
itself of art  is never anything but this distinguishing, because 
the artist arrives at  purity of expression precisely by elimi- 
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nating the ugly which menaces to invade i t ;  and this ugliness 
is his tumultuous human passions striving against the pure 
passion of a r t :  his weaknesses, his prejudices, his conve- 
nience, his Eaissez faire, his haste, his having one eye on ar t  
and another on the spectator, on the editor, on the impre- 
sario-all of them things that impede the artist in the phy- 
siological bearing and normal birth of his image-expression, 
the poet of the verse that rings and creates, the painter of 
sure drawing and harmonious colour, the composer of mel- 
ody, and introduces into their work, if care be not taken to 
defend themselves against it, sonorous and empty verses, 
incorrections, lack of harmony, discordances. And since the 
artist, at the moment of producing, is a very severe judge of 
himself from whom nothing escapes,-not even that which 
escapes others,-others also discern, immediately and very 
clearly, in the spontaneity of contemplation, where the artist 
has been an artist and where he has been a man, a poor man; 
in what works, o r  in what parts of works, lyrical enthusiasm 
and creative fancy reign supreme, and in what they have 
become chilled and have yielded their place to other things, 
which pretend to be art, and therefore (considered from 
the aspect of this pretence) are called “ugly.” What  is the 
use o f  the sentence of criticism, when the sentence has al- 
ready been given by genius and by taste? Genius and taste 
are legion, they are people, they are general and secular con- 
sensus of opinion. So true is this, that the sentences of criti- 
cism are always given too late; they consecrate forms that 
have already been solemnly consecrated with universal ap- 
plause (pure applause must not, however, be confounded 
with the clapping of hands and with social notoriety, the 
constancy of glory with the caducity of fortune), they con- 
demn ugliness already condemned, grown wearisome and 
forgotten, o r  still praised in words, but with a bad conscience, 
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through prejudice and obstinate pride. Criticism, conceived 
as a magistrate, kills the dead or  blows air upon the face of 
the living, who is quite lively, in the belief that its breath is 
that of the God who brings life ; that is, it performs a useless 
task, because this has previously been performed. I ask 
myself what critics have established the greatness of Dante, 
of Shakespeare, o r  of Michelangelo : if, among the legions 
who have acclaimed and do acclaim these great men, 
there are or  have been men of letters and professional crit- 
ics, their acclamation does not differ in this case from that 
of youth and of the people, who are all equally ready to  
open their hearts to the beautiful, which speaks to  all, save 
sometimes, when it is silent, on discovering the surly coun- 
tenance of a critic-judge. 
And so there arises a third conception of criticism: the 
criticism of interpretation o r  comment, which makes itself 
small before works of art  and limits itself to the duty of 
dusting, placing in a good light, furnishing information as 
to  the period at  which a picture was painted and what it 
represents, explaining linguistic forms, historical allusions, 
the presumptions of fact and of idea in a poem; and in both 
cases, its duty performed, permits the art to act sponta- 
neously within the soul of the onlooker and of the reader, 
who will then judge of it according as his intimate taste tells 
him to judge. In this case the critic appears as a culti- 
vated cicerone or  as a patient and discreet schoolmaster: 
“Criticism is the ar t  of teaching to read,” is the definition of 
a famous critic; and the definition has not been without its 
echo. Now no one contests the utility of guides to  museums 
or  exhibitions, o r  of teachers of reading, still less of erudite 
guides and masters who know so many things hidden from 
the majority and are able to  throw so much light on subjects. 
Not  only has the art that is most remote from us need of 
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this assistance, but also that of the nearest past, called con- 
temporary, which, although it treats of subjects and presents 
forms that seem to be obvious, is yet not always sufficiently 
obvious; and sometimes a great effort is requisite in order to 
prepare people to feel the beauty of a little poem or  of some 
work of art, though born but yesterday. Prejudices, habits 
and forgetfulness form hedges barring the approach to that 
work: the expert hand of the interpreter and of the com- 
mentator is required to remove them. Criticism in this sense 
is certainly most useful, but we do not see why it should be 
called criticism when that sort of work already possesses its 
own name of interpretation, comment, or  exegesis. To  call 
this criticism is at  best useless, for  it is equivocal. 
I t  is equivocal because criticism demands to be, wishes to 
be and is something different: it does not wish to invade art ,  
nor to rediscover the beauty of the beautiful, or  the ugliness 
of the ugly, nor to make itself small before art, but rather 
to make itself great before ar t  which is great and, in a cer- 
tain sense, above it. What ,  then, is legitimate and true 
criticism ? 
First of all, it is at once all three of the things that I have 
hitherto explained: that is to say, all these three things are 
its necessary conditions, without which it would not arise. 
Without the moment of art  (and, as we have seen, that criti- 
cism which affirms itself to be productive o r  an aid to  
production, o r  as repressing certain forms of production to 
the advantage of certain other forms, is, in a certain sense, 
ar t  against a r t ) ,  the experience of art  would be wanting to 
the critic, art  created within his spirit, severed from non- 
art, and enjoyed in preference to that. And finally, this 
experience would be wanting without exegesis, without the 
removal of the obstacles to reproductive fancy, which supply 
the spirit with those presumptions of historical knowledge 
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of which it has need, and which are the wood to  burn in 
the fire of fancy. 
But here, before going further, it will be well to resolve a 
grave doubt which has been agitated and is still agitated, 
both in philosophical literature and in ordinary thought, and 
which certainly, where justified, would not only compromise 
the possibility of criticism, of which I am discoursing, but 
also of reproductive fancy itself, o r  taste. Is it truly pos- 
sible to collect, as does exegesis, the materials required for 
reproducing the work of art of others (o r  our own past 
work of art, when we search our memory and consult our 
papers in order to remember what we were when we pro- 
duced i t ) ,  and to reproduce that work of ar t  in our fancy in 
its genuine features? Can the collection of the material 
required be ever complete? And however complete it be, 
will the fancy ever permit itself to be chained by it in its 
labour of reproduction? Will it not act as a new fancy, in- 
troducing new material? Will it not be obliged to do so, 
owing to its impotence truly to reproduce the other and the 
past? Is the reproduction of the individual, of the indi- 
viduum inetabile,  conceivable, when every sane philosophy 
teaches that the universal alone is eternally reproducible? 
Will not the reproduction of the works of art  of others or  
of the past be consequently a simple impossibility; and will 
not what is usually alleged as an undisputed fact in ordinary 
conversation, and is the expressed or  implied presupposition 
in every dispute upon art, be perhaps (as was said of history 
in general) une fable convenue? 
Truly, when we consider the problem rather from with- 
out, it will seem most improbable that the firm belief which 
all possess in the comprehension and intelligence of art  is 
without foundation,-all the more, if we observe that these 
very people who deny the possibility of reproductions in 
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abstract theory-or, as they call it, the absoluteness of taste 
-are yet most tenacious in maintaining their own judgments 
of taste, and very clearly realise the difference there is be- 
tween the affirmation that wine pleases o r  displeases me 
because it agrees or disagrees with my physiological organ- 
ism, and the affirmation that a poemis beautiful, and another 
a pastiche: the second order of judgments (as  Kant shows 
in a classical analysis) carries with it the uncoercible preten- 
sion to universal validity; souls become passionate about 
i t ;  and in days of chivalry there were even those who main- 
tained the beauty of the “Gerusalemme,” sword in hand, 
whereas no one that we know has ever been killed main- 
taining, sword in hand, that wine was pleasant o r  unpleas- 
ant. T o  object that works artistically base have yet pleased 
many or  someone, and if not others, their author, is not 
valid, because their having pleased is not set in doubt (since 
nothing can be born in the soul without the consent of the 
soul, and consequently without a correlative pleasure) ; but 
it is doubted whether that pleasure were asthetic, and 
were founded upon a judgment of taste and beauty. And 
passing from extrinsic scepticism to intrinsic consideration, 
it should be said that the objection to the conceivability of 
the asthetic reproduction is founded upon a reality conceived 
in its turn as a shock of  atoms, or as abstractly monadistic, 
composed of monads without communication among them- 
selves and harmonised only from without. But that is not 
reality: reality is spiritual unity, and in spiritual unity noth- 
ing is lost, everything is an eternal possession. Not  only the 
reproduction of art, but, in general, the memory of any fact 
(which is indeed always reproduction of intuitions), would 
be inconceivable without the unity of the real ; and if we had 
not been ourselves Casar  and Pompey,-that is, that univer- 
sal which was once determined as Casar  and Pompey and is 
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now determined as ourselves, they living in us,-we should 
be unable to form any idea of Caesar and Pompey. And 
further, the doctrine that individuality is irreproducible and 
the universal only reproducible is certainly a doctrine of 
“sound” philosophy, but of sound scholastic philosophy, 
which separated universal and individual, making the latter 
an accident of the former (dust carried along by time), and 
did not know that the true universal is the universal indi- 
viduated, and that the only true efable is the so-called 
ineffable, the concrete and individual. And finally, what 
does it matter if we have not always ready the material for 
reproducing with full exactitude all works of ar t  o r  any 
work of ar t  of the past? Fully exact reproduction is, like 
every human work, an ideal which is realised in infinity, and 
therefore is always realised in such a manner that it is ad- 
mitted at every instant of time by the conformation of real- 
ity. Is there a suggestion in a poem of which the full 
signification escapes us? No one will wish to affirm that that 
suggestion, of which we now have a crepuscular vision that 
fails to satisfy, will not be better determined in the future 
by means of research and meditation and by the formation 
of favourable conditions and sympathetic currents. 
Therefore, inasmuch as taste is most sure of the legiti- 
macy of its discussions, by just so much is historical research 
and interpretation indefatigable in restoring and preserving 
and widening the knowledge of the past;  not mentioning 
that relativists and sceptics, both in taste and in history, utter 
their desperate cries from time to time, which do not reduce 
anyone, not even themselves, as we have seen, to the effec- 
tual desperation of not judging. 
Closing here this long but indispensable parenthesis and 
taking up the thread of the discourse, art,  historical exegesis, 
and taste, if they be conditions of criticism, are not yet criti- 
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cism. Indeed, nothing is obtained by means of that triple 
presupposition, save the reproduction and enjoyment of 
the image-expression; that is to say, we return and place 
ourselves neither more nor less than in the place of the 
artist-producer in the act of producing his image. Nor  can 
we escape from those conditions, as some boast of doing, by 
proposing to ourselves to reproduce in a new form the work 
of the poet and the artist by providing its equivalent; hence 
they define the critic: artifex additus artifici. Because that 
reproduction in a new garment would be a translation, o r  a 
variation, another work of art, to some extent inspired by 
the first; and if it were the same, it would be a reproduction 
pure and simple, a material reproduction, with the same 
words, the same colours, and the same tones-that is, useless. 
T h e  critic is not artifex additus artifici, but philosophus ad- 
ditus artifici: his work is not achieved, save when the image 
received is both preserved and surpassed; it belongs to  
thought, which we have seen surpass and illumine fancy with 
new light, make the intuition perception, qualify reality, and 
therefore distinguish reality from unreality. In this percep- 
tion, this distinction, which is always and altogether criti- 
cism o r  judgment, the criticism of art, of which we are now 
especially treating, originates with the question : whether 
and in what measure the fact, which we have before us as a 
problem, is intuition-that is to say, is real as such; and 
whether and in what measure, it is not such-that is to say, 
is unreal : reality and unreality, which in ar t  are called beauty 
and ugliness, as in logic they are called truth and error, in 
economy gain and loss, in ethic good and evil. Thus the 
whole criticism of art can be reduced to this briefest proposi- 
tion, which further serves to differentiate its work from that 
of ar t  and taste (which, considered in themselves, are logi- 
cally mute),  and from exegetical erudition (which lacks Iogi- 
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cal synthesis, and is therefore also logically mute) : “There 
is a work of ar t  u,” with the corresponding negative : “There 
is not a work of art  u.” 
It seems to be a trifle, for the definition of ar t  as intuition 
seemed to be neither more nor less than a trifle, but it has 
on the contrary been since seen how many things it included 
in itself, how many affirmations and how many negations: 
so many that, although I have proceeded and proceed in a 
condensed manner, I have not been able and will not be 
able to afford more than brief mention of them. Tha t  
proposition o r  judgment of the criticism of art, “The work of 
ar t  u is,’) implies, above all, like every judgment, a subject 
(the intuition of the work of ar t  u )  to conquer which is 
needed the labour of exegesis and of fantastic reproduction, 
together with the discernment of taste : we have already seen 
how difficult and complicated this is, and how many go astray 
in it, through lack of fancy, o r  owing to slightness and super- 
ficiality of culture. And it further implies, like every judg- 
ment, a predicate, a category, and in this case the category 
of art, which must be conceived in the judgment, and which 
therefore becomes the concept of art. And we have also 
seen, as regards the concept of art, to what difficulties and 
complications it gives rise, and how it is a possession always 
unstable, continually attacked and ambushed, and continu- 
ally to be defended against assaults and ambushes. Criti- 
cism of art, therefore, develops and grows, declines and 
reappears, with the development, the decadence, and the 
reappearance of the philosophy of a r t ;  and each can com- 
pare what it was in the Middle Ages (when it may almost 
be said that it was not) with what it became in the first half 
of the nineteenth century with Herder,  with Hegel, and with 
the Romantics, in Italy with D e  Sanctis; and in a narrower 
field, what it was with D e  Sanctis, and what it became in the 
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following period of naturalism, in which the concept of art  
became clouded and finally confused with physic and with 
physiology, and even with pathology. And if disagreements 
as to  judgments depend for  one half, or less than half, upon 
lack of clearness as to what the artist has done, lack of sym- 
pathy and taste for another half, o r  more than half, this 
arises from the small clearness of ideas upon a r t ;  whence 
it often happens that two individuals are substantially a t  one 
as to  the value of a work of art, save that the one approves 
what the other blames, because each refers to  a different 
definition of art. 
And owing to this dependence of criticism upon the con- 
cept of art, as many forms of false criticism are to  be 
distinguished as there are false philosophies of art  ; and, 
limiting ourselves to  the principal forms of which we have 
already discoursed, there is a kind of criticism which, instead 
of reproducing and characterising art, breaks in pieces and 
classifies i t ;  there is another, moralistic, which treats works 
of art  like actions in respect of  ends which the artist pro- 
poses o r  should have proposed to himself; there is hedonistic 
criticism, which presents art  as having attained or  failed to 
attain to pleasure and amusement: there is also the intel- 
lectualistic form, which measures progress according to  the 
progress of philosophy, knows the philosophy but not the 
passion of Dante, judges Ariosto feeble because he has a 
feeble philosophy, Tasso more serious because his philos- 
ophy is more serious, Leopardi contradictory in his pessi- 
mism. There is that criticism usually called psychological, 
which separates content from form, and instead of attending 
to works of art, attends to the psychology of the artists as 
men; and there is the other form, which separates form 
from content and is pleased with abstract forms because, 
according to cases and to  individual sympathies, they recall 
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antiquity or the Middle Ages; and there is yet another, 
which finds beauty where it finds rhetorical ornaments ; and 
finally there is that which, having fixed the laws of the kinds 
and of the arts, receives o r  rejects works of art  according 
as they approach o r  retreat from the models which they 
have formed. I have not enumerated them all, nor had 
I the intention of so doing, nor do I wish to  expound the 
criticism of criticism, which could be nothing but a repetition 
of the already traced criticism and dialectic of Esthet ic  ; and 
already here and there will have been observed the begin- 
nings of inevitable repetition. I t  would be more profitable 
to  summarise (if even a rapid summary did not demand too 
much space) the history of criticism, to  place the historical 
names in the ideal positions that I have indicated, and to 
shew how criticism of models raged above all during the 
Italian and French classical periods, conceptualistic criticism 
in German philosophy of the nineteenth century, that of 
moralistic description at  the period of religious reform or 
of the Italian national revival, psychology in France with 
Sainte-Beuve and many others ; how the hedonistic form 
had its widest diffusion among people in society, among 
boudoir and journalistic critics ; that of classifications, in 
schools, where the duty of criticism is believed to have been 
successfully fulfilled when the so-called origin of metres and 
literary and artistic kinds and their representatives has been 
investigated. 
But the forms which I have briefly described are forms of 
criticism, however erroneous ; though this cannot, in truth, 
be said of other forms which raise their banners and combat 
among themselves, under the names of “resthetic criticism’’ 
and “historical criticism.’) These I beg leave to baptise, on 
the contrary, as they deserve, pseudo-esthetic criticism (or  
resthetistic) , and pseudo-historical criticism (or  historisti- 
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cal). These two forms, though very much opposed, have 
a common hatred of  philosophy in general, and of the con- 
cept of ar t  in particular: against any intervention of thought 
in the criticism of art, which in the opinion of the former 
is the affair of artistic souls; in the opinion of the latter, of 
the erudite. In other words, they debase criticism below 
criticism, the former limiting it to pure taste and enjoyment 
of art, the latter to pure exegetical research or  preparation 
of materials for reproduction by the fancy. Wha t  Esthetic,  
which implies thought and concept of art, can have to  do 
with pure taste without concept is difficult to say; and what 
history can have to do  with disconnected erudition relative 
to art, which is not organisable as history because without a 
concept of ar t  and ignorant of what ar t  is (whereas history 
demands always that we should know that of which we nar- 
rate the history), is yet more difficult to establish; at the 
most we could note the reasons for the strange “fortune” 
which those two words have experienced. But there would 
be no harm in those names or  in the refusal to exercise criti- 
cism, provided that the upholders of both should remain 
within the boundaries assigned by themselves, these enjoying 
works of art, those collecting material for exegesis ; and they 
might leave criticism to him who should wish to criticise, o r  
satisfy themselves with speaking ill of it without touching 
problems which properly belong to criticism. In order to 
attain to such an attitude of reserve it would be necessary 
neither more nor less than that the aesthetes should never 
open their mouths in ecstasy about art, that they should si- 
lently degustate their joys, and, at the most, that when they 
met their like they should understand one another, as animals 
are said to do  (who knows, though, i f  it be true!) without 
speaking : their countenance unconsciously bearing an expres- 
sion of ravishment, their arms outstretched in an attitude of 
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wonder, o r  their hands joined in a prayer of thanksgiving 
for the joy experienced, should suffice for  everything. His- 
torians, for their part, might certainly speak: speak of 
codices, of corrections, of chronical and of topical dates, of 
political facts, of biographical occurrences, of sources of 
works, of language, of syntaxes, of metres, but never of art, 
which they serve, but to whose countenance, as simple eru- 
dites, they cannot raise their eyes, as the maid-servant does 
not raise them to look upon her mistress, whose clothes she 
nevertheless brushes and whose food she prepares : sic V O S ,  
non vobis. But go and ask of men such abstentions, sacri- 
fices, and heroisms, however extravagant in their ideas and 
fanatic in their extravagances1 In  particular, go and ask 
those who, for one o r  another reason, are occupied with ar t  
all their lives, not to  talk of  or  to  judge ar t  I But the mute 
asthetisticians talk of, judge, and argue about art, and the 
inconclusive historicians do the same ; and since in thus talk- 
ing they are without the guide of philosophy and of the 
concept of art, which they despise and abhor, and yet have 
need of a concept,-when good sense does not fortunately 
happen to  suggest the right one to them, without their being 
aware of it,-they wander among all the various preconcep- 
tions, moralistic and hedonistic, intellectualistic and content- 
istic, formalistic and rhetorical, physiological and academi- 
cal, which I have recorded, now relying upon this one, now 
upon that, now confounding them all and contaminating one 
with the other. And the most curious spectacle (though to  
be foreseen by the philosopher) is that the asthetisticians 
and historicians, those irreconcilable adversaries, although 
they start from opposite points, yet agree so well that they 
end by uttering the same fatuities; and nothing is more 
amusing than to meet again the most musty intellectualistic 
and moralistic ideas in the pages of deeply moved lovers of 
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art  (so deeply moved as to  hate thought), and in the most 
positive historians (so positive as to  fear compromising 
their positivity by attempting to understand the object of 
their researches, which chances this time to  be called a r t ) .  
T rue  criticism of art  is certainly esthetic criticism, but not 
because it disdains philosophy, like pseudo-asthetic, but be- 
cause it acts as philosophy and as conception of a r t ;  it is 
historical criticism, not because, like pseudo-history, it deals 
with the extrinsic of art, but because, after having availed 
itself of historical data for fantastic reproduction (and till 
then it is not yet history), when fantastic reproduction has 
been obtained, it becomes history, by determining what is 
that fact which has been reproduced in the fancy, and so 
characterising the fact by means of the concept, and estab- 
lishing what exactly is the fact that has occurred. Thus,  the 
two things a t  variance in spheres inferior to criticism co- 
incide in criticism; and “historical criticism of urt” and 
“esthetic criticism” are the same: it is indifferent which word 
we use, for each may have its special use solely for reasons 
of convenience, as when, for instance, it is desired to  call 
special attention, with the first, to  the necessity of the under- 
standing of a r t ;  with the second, to the historical objectivity 
of its consideration. Thus the problem discussed by certain 
methodologists is solved, namely, whether history enter into 
the criticism of ar t  as means or as end: since it is henceforth 
clear that history adopted as a means is not history, pre- 
cisely because it is a means, but is exegetic material ; and that 
which enters it as end is certainly history, though it does not 
enter it as a particular element, but as its constituent whole : 
which precisely describes the word “end.” 
But i f  criticism of art  be historical criticism, it follows 
that it will not be possible to limit the duty of discerning the 
beautiful and the ugly to simple approval and refusal in 
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the immediate consciousness of the artist when he produces, 
o r  of the man of taste when he contemplates; it must 
widen and elevate itself to what is called explanation. And 
since in the world of history (which is, indeed, the only 
world) negative o r  privative facts do not exist, what seems 
to taste to be ugly and repugnant, because not artistic, will 
be neither ugly nor repugnant to historical consideration, 
because it knows that what is not artistic yet is something 
else, and has its right to existence as truly as it has existed. 
The  virtuous Catholic allegory composed by Tasso for his 
Gerusalemme” is not artistic, nor the patriotic declamation 
of Niccolini and Guerrazzi, nor the subtleties and conceits 
which Petrarch introduced into his poems; but Tasso’s 
allegory is one of the manifestations of the work of the 
Catholic counter-reform in the Latin countries ; the declama- 
tions of Niccolini and of Guerrazzi were violent attempts 
to rouse the souls of Italians against the priest and the 
stranger, representing adhesion to the manner of that arous- 
ing; the subtleties and conceits of Petrarch, the cult of tradi- 
tional troubadour elegance, revived and enriched in the new 
Italian civilisation ; that is to say, they are all practical facts, 
very significant historically and worthy of respect. W e  can 
well continue to talk of the beautiful and of the ugly, in the 
field of historical criticism, through vivacity of language, o r  
in order to chime with current parlance; provided that we 
shew at the same time, o r  hint, o r  let be understood, o r  at  
least do not exclude, the positive content, both of that beauti- 
ful and of that ugly, which will never be so radically con- 
demned in its ugliness as when it is fu l ly  justified and under- 
stood, because in this case it will be removed in the most 
radical manner from the sphere proper to art. 
Fo r  this reason, criticism of art, when truly resthetic o r  
historical, becomes at  the same time amplified into a criti- 
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cism of life, since it is not possible to judge-that is, to char- 
acterise-works of ar t  without at the same time judging and 
characterising the works of the whole life: as we observe 
with the truly great critics, and above all with De  Sanctis, 
in his “History of Italian Literature” and in his “Critical 
Essays,” who is as profound a critic of ar t  as of philosophy, 
morality, and politics; he is profound in the one because pro- 
found in the other, and inversely: the strength of his pure 
asthetic consideration of ar t  is the strength of his pure 
moral consideration of morality. Because the forms of the 
spirit, of which criticism avails itself as categories of judg- 
ment, although ideally distinguishable in unity, are not ma- 
terially separable from one another and from unity, under 
penalty of seeing them vanish before us. W e  cannot, there- 
fore, speak of a distinction of ar t  from other criticism, save 
in an empirical manner, to indicate that the attention of the 
speaker o r  writer is directed to one rather than to another 
part  of his indivisible argument. And the distinction is also 
empirical ( I  have hitherto preserved this here, in order to  
proceed with didactic clearness) between criticism and his- 
tory of a r t :  a distinction which has been specially deter- 
mined by the fact that a polemical element prevails in the 
study of contemporary art  and literature, which causes it to 
be more readily called “criticism,” while in that of the art  
and literature of a more remote period prevails the narra- 
tive tone, and therefore it is more readily termed “history.” 
In reality, true and complete criticism is the serene historical 
narration of what has happened; and history is the only true 
criticism that can be exercised upon the doings of humanity, 
which cannot be not-facts, since they have happened, and are 
not to be dominated by the spirit otherwise than by under- 
standing them. And since the criticism of ar t  has shewn 
itself inseparable from other criticism, so the history of ar t  
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can be separated from the complete history of human civili- 
sation only for reasons of a literary nature, among which it 
certainly follows its own law, which is art, but from which it 
receives the historical movement, which belongs to the spirit 
as a whole, never to one form of the spirit separated from 
the others. 
BENEDETTO CROCE. 


